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Abstract
In this paper, we present an application of the estimation of a Spatial Covariance Function in
determining the relevant geographic market for a merger. We applied this methodology on the case
of a proposed marger between two competing supermarket chains in Brazil. During this application,
we ￿rst indicate the shortcomings of the analysis carried out by the Brazilian Antitrust System on its
evaluation of the merger. This analysis decreed the geographic dimension of the relevant market to
be separated on each of the municipalities on the shore of the Sao Paulo state. Our results, using the
estimated spatial covariance function using data on 22 products in 43 supermarkets, indicate a single
geographic market for all cities.
Resumo: Neste artigo, apresentamos uma aplica￿ªo de estimativa de uma Fun￿ªo de Covari￿n-
cia Espacial para a determina￿ªo do mercado relevante geogrÆ￿co para uma fusªo. N￿s aplicamos
esta metodologia para uma fusªo proposta entre duas cadeias de supermercados no Brasil. Ao longo
desta anÆlise, n￿s inicialmente indicamos as limita￿ıes da anÆlise realizada pelo Sistema Brasileiro
de Defesa da ConcorrŒncia durante a sua avalia￿ªo da fusªo, que indicava que a dimensªo geogrÆ￿ca
do mercado se limitava a cada um dos munic￿pios no litoral sul do Estado de Sªo Paulo. Os nossos
resultados, obtidos a partir da fun￿ªo de covari￿ncia espacial e utilizando dados de 22 produtos em
43 supermercados, indicam a existŒncia de um œnico mercado relevante abrangendo todas as cidades.
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11 Introduction
The analysis of mergers relies on a great extent on determining on which markets the resulting
entity can exercise an eventual market power. Furthermore, given the emprasis the economist
gives to the study of markets, it is to be expected that economic theory would have a satisfactory
reply to the questions regarding the setting of bounadries for these markets. However, in applied
settings, many di￿erent techniques have been used, relying on di￿erent types of assumptions on
the competitive structure of the markets involved, on the statistical properties of the data at hand
and on the judgment of the analyst. This paper aims to contribute to the debate by presenting a
new technique can be used on the setting of the relevant market boundaries for a proposed merger,
based on computation of the spatial correlation function, developed in Cressie (1993), Conley
and Topa (2002) and Chen and Conley (2001). These papers measure the correlation between
realizations of random variables as a function of a distance, measured according to a properly
determined metric.
To better position our contribution to this literature, the starting point of this paper is by
reviewing the procedures currently used on the setting of boundaries of relevant geographic mar-
kets. The most important concept used by antitrust authorities on applied merger analysis is the
market power concept: the capacity a company has to unilaterally increase its prices after a merger
operation. In order to make this concept operational, the ￿rst question to be addressed is: what
constitutes the relevant market for this merger operation? In other words, if this merger could
possibly pose the threat of unilateral exercise of market power, on which market this power would
be exercised?
To answer that question, usually two dimensions of this relevant market are considered: the
product dimension and the geographic dimension. These dimensions are de￿ned using the so-
called SSNIP (Small, but Signi￿cant and Non-transitory Increase in Prices) test, which implies
the product and geographic markets are the minimum set of substitute products and geographic
area which could act a competitive check to an unilateral increase in prices of a given percentage1.
There is a number of techniques available for this task. One of the ￿rst tecnhiques proposed
to deal with this problem evaluates the product ￿ows between di￿erent areas; if one does ￿nd that
the ￿ows of the product coming from outside a given geographic area are responsible for a small
part of the consumption there, one does have evidence against the hypothesis this area is part
of a larger geographic market. The second part of the test ￿ considered by Elzinga and Hogarty
(1973, 1978) to be enough for the setting of marketr boundaries ￿ is to evaluate if the shipments
to outside this geographic area account for a small part of the production carried out there. If so,
this region can be considered a separate geographic market. This approach came under criticism
1Competitive check meaning the company who tries to increase its prices by that amount ￿nds it unpro￿table
to do so. A survey on the theme is found in Motta (2004, cap.2).
2from Stigler and Sherwin (1985, p. 555), who point out the existence or not of signi￿cant product
￿ows between regions does not imply they belong to the same market, in the sense the producers
in one region act as a competitive check eliminating persistent price di￿erences. They mentioned
the fact that, even two regions belonging to di￿erent geographic markets could present large trade
￿ows and, because of price discrimination ￿ say, due to di￿erent demand elasticities ￿ one could
observe di￿erent prices. Furthermore, even if we do not ￿nd any ￿ow between these two regions,
it does not warrant they are di￿erent markets; it is possible the producers in one region pose such
a competitive constraint on the other’s that we observe the same price in both regions but no
shipments between them.
The second approach for the determination of market boundaries tries to estimate the elastic-
ities2 for a given product. On this approach, some authors (Werden (1998)) favor the use of the
own-price elasticity of demand. Their reasoning is based upon the fact, derived from traditional
economic theory, there is a boundary on the own price elasticity of demand that makes it unprof-
itable for a producer in a given geographic area unilaterally increase its prices. That boundary
￿ called critical elasticity of demand ￿ depends on both the margins these products earn and the
hypothetic price increase de￿ned on the SSNIP test. Another point of view on this approach
involves the computation of the elasticity of the residual demand (Werden and Froeb (1993) and
She￿man and Spiller (1987)). The elasticity of the residual demand di￿ers from the traditional
price elasticity of demand in which it already considers all the e￿ects of all competitors’ responses
to a given increase in prices by a producer. The empirical implementation of this technique de-
mands both the setting up of a structural model for the competition and the determination of a
set of instrumental variables for the estimation of the aforementioned elasticity.
The ￿nal way by which elasticities are used on the setting of relevant market boundaries involves
the estimation of cross-price demand elasticities. These estimates, which are expected to measure
how much ￿ as a percentage ￿ the quantity demanded of a product changes in response to a given
percentage increase on the price of another product, could provide a map on which regions could
provide a competitive check on price increases by some producers. For instance, if one does ￿nd
a positive elasticity between the price of a given product sold on the region A and the price of
the same product sold on the region B, it might mean the producers on the region B can act as
competitive constraint on the behavior of those on region A.
The ￿might￿ on the previous paragraph is due to a potential pitfall all these approaches su￿er
￿ the so-called cellophane fallacy. This fallacy follows from the fact these estimates are based on
the prices collected at the moment of the investigation. However, the SSNIP test mentions a hy-
2Elasticity is a measure ￿ adimensional ￿ that gives the percentage change on the demanded quantity of a
product in response to a given percentage change on other economic variable. The most common elasticities are
the own price elasticitiy (measuring the sensitivity of the quantity demanded to changes in its own price), the cross
price (measuring the sensitivity to changes in the prices of other products) and income elasticity (the sensitivity to
changes in the income).
3pothetical price increase from the price levels that would be veri￿ed under competitive conditions.
As reported by Motta (2004, p. 105), the US Supreme Court determined the market for cellophane
relevant for a proposed merger involving U.S. DuPont should include other ￿exible wrapping ma-
terials, given the high cross elasticity of demand between cellophane and these wrapping materials.
This decision was criticized on the grounds that such high cross price elasticity was in itself a result
of market power, by which DuPont increased its prices until other products started to consider
other wrapping materials as substitutes.
The third approach on setting the boundaries of relevant makets is based on the concept
summarized by Stigler and Sherwin (1985, p. 555):
￿Consider the basic de￿nition of a market: ’A market for a good is the area within the
price of a good tends to uniformity, allowance made for transportation costs.’ If there
is a single price (allowing for transportation costs) over a given area, that must mean
that either buyers or sellers (or both) can and do consider transactions at any point
within the area to be an excellent (in the limit, a perfect) substitute for transactions
at other points within the area. Hence, the market area embraces the buyers who are
willing to deal with any seller, or the sellers who are willing to deal with any buyer, or
both.￿3
This quotation sums up the reason for the usage of price correlations as a way to determine the
geographic dimensions of a market, as in Stigler and Sherwin (1985) and Horowitz (1981). If we
have a set of locations denoted by S = fs1;s2;:::sng corresponding to the locations of n sellers,
and the prices charged by all these sellers indexed by P = fPs1;Ps2;:::;Psng and we ￿nd that
Cov(Psi;Psk) > 0, we expect the producers i and k to be in the same market. On the other hand,
if we ￿nd that Cov(Psi;Psk) = 0, this might be interpreted as the producers i and k do not belong
in the same market.
Slade (1986) points out that correlations might be spuriously high, if one does not control
for the impact of other factors that impact the behavior of the prices at di￿erent locations, or
induce stochastic trends on the behavior of the prices. The author uses Granger causality tests
to address some of this problem. A very thoughtful critique of the usage of price correlation tests
on market analysis on antitrust is given by Werden and Froeb (1993). Their critique is based on
the fact the price correlation tests are carried out without regard to an explicit modelling of the
consumers’ choices, and that an informed application of economic theory underlining the SSNIP
test could present better results, and recommend the usage of residual demand elasticities as a
tool for determining such boundaries.
Sherwin (1993), in a comment to the paper by Werden and Froeb on the same issue they present
their critique, replies by pointing out the implementation of the SSNIP test Werden and Froeb
3 The quotation used by Stigler and Sherwin on the excerpt above is from Cournot, and taken by Marshall.
4(1993) propose is also fraught with di￿culties, and the fact the authors do not provide conclusive
evidence concerning the superiority of their proposal over price correlation tests. Finally, Sherwin
(1993) also points out Werden and Froeb (1993) proposal requires a higher degree of economic
analysis in order to identify the structure of competition on the market under scrutiny, thus giving
subsdies to econometrically building a structural model in order to get estimates to the relevant
residual demand elasticities. As Sherwin (1993, p. 356) points out:
￿Such an approach ignores the fundamental purpose of the Guidelines in the ￿rst place,
that is, to give guidance to those contemplating mergers and acquisitions. Indeed,
why have the Guidelines at all? Instead, a fact-intensive economic analysis (whatever
that means) could simply be used to evaluate directly the ultimate question of whether
prices are likely to rise as a result of a merger. Why bother with market delineation
and market share calculations, which are, after all, only intermediate inquiries?￿
This quotation sums up the point that, even though sometimes it is required the use of a structural
model to estimate price correlations, usually it is not required the setting up of a full economic
model of the competition on the market in order to get statistically consistent estimates of the
relevant parameters. This point also underlies our choice of technique ￿ spatial covariance function
￿ for establishing the boundaries of the relevant markets. We will discuss the theoretical aspects
of the estimation of such functions on the next section.
2 Spatial Covariance Function
The responses by Sherwin (1993) to the criticisms posed by Werden and Froeb (1993) allow us to
set a criterion for the setting of a relevant geographic market for a proposed merger. It indicates
the geographic market as the area for which we will ￿nd signi￿cant correlation between the prices
for the products sold in this area, and we ￿nd non-signi￿cant correlaitions for the products sold
outside of this area.
However, we have a problem with the application of this concept: we may not have data on
every location needed for determining the market boundary. For instance, if we do ￿nd a positive
covariance between the prices in two locations, si and sj and we do not ￿nd a positive covariance
between the prices recorded at si and sk, we only know the market boundary lies between sj and
sk, but not where. To overcome these di￿culties, and still be consistent with the principle set
forth above, we propose the use of the spatial covariance function as a guideline for setting the
limits of the relevant market. This function can be denoted as C(jj¿jj) and expresses the covariance
between the variables as a function of the distance between the distance between them ￿ expressed
as jj¿jj.
5This spatial covariance function can be estimated non-parametrically by the local averaging
method of Conley and Topa (2002) or by a shape preserving cardinal B-spline sieve, as used in Chen
and Conley (2001). Both of them assume the locations of the agents are exogenous to the data
generating process of the variable studied, the variable to be stationary and isotropic4. The shape
preserving cardinal B-spline wavelet sieve, which will be used on this paper, is a special case of
the method of sieves (Grenander (1981)). They consist on using a sequence of parametric families
￿ in our case, the B-spline sieve ￿ to approximate unknown functions. The unknown function we
are trying to approximate is the analogous of the spectral measure for covariance stationary time
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Given those estimates, the next point is to determine con￿dence intervals for those estimated co-
variances. The con￿dence intervals, as shown on the paper by Chen and Conley (2001), are derived
for any desired level of con￿dence by bootstrapping. This non-parametric estimation presents some
advantages to the most common technique used on spatial econometrics analyses ￿ the Spatial Au-
4 That means the correlation between the realizations of the variable in two locations depends only on the
distance between them and not on direction.
5 For details, see Chen and Conley (2001).
6toregressive (SAR) Model or the Conditionally Autoregressive (CAR) Model. Both models model
the spatial dependence as a function of two elements: a neighbor matrix, usually denoted W, and
a spatial correlation parameter, commonly denoted ½. Wall (2004) ￿nds some puzzling results
on the application of this model on a quite simple setting, such as non-robustness of the results
on the de￿nition of the W matrix. In other words, small errors on the de￿nition of the neigh-
borhood matrix implies in large changes on the estimated spatial covariances.Furthermore, Wall
(2004) ￿nds out that the ordering of the spatial correlations does change as the spatial correlation
parameter changes within the allowed range required to estimate the spatial correlations. Both
problems does not exist on the methodology set forth above, which gives results robust to small
errors on the recording of the distances between agents (Conley (1999)). The next section presents
an application os this methodology for an antitrust case involving supermarkets.
3 Application: the Brazilian Supermarkets
In February 03, 1999 two supermarket companies, CBD6 and PERALTA sumbitted a memorandum
to the Brazilian Antitrust System in which CBD expressed its intent to purchase thirty eight
supermarkets and one warehouse belonging to the PERALTA chain. The supermarkets involved
on this operation were located on the following municipalities:
Table 1: Supermarkets (PERALTA) and Cities
City Supermarkets City Supermarket
Sao Paulo 9 Praia Grande 4
Cubatao 3 Sao Bernardo do Campo 1
Santos 7 Itapecerica da Serra 1
Mongagua 1 Caraguatatuba 1
Guaruja 3 Guarulhos 1
Peruibe 1 Sao Sebastiao
Itanhaem 1
The Brazilian Antitrust System is composed of two Commissions, one of them a￿liated with
the Finance Ministry (SEAE7), and another one associated with the Ministry of Justice (SDE8).
They are in charge of investigating the proposed merger and issuing a opinion on which points are
to be blocked and which remedies are proposed. The opinion goes to the deciding body (CADE9),
whose judges have the ￿nal ruling. The memo was received by the commission associated with the
Ministry of Justice (SDE), and carried out an analysis of the proposed merger, to be submitted to
CADE.
6 Acronym for its Portuguese name, Companhia Brasileira de Distribuicao.
7 In Portuguese, Secretaria Especial de Acompanhamento Economico.
8 Acronym for its Portuguese name, Secretaria de Direito Economico.
9 In Portuguese, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica.
7On its analysis of the geographic dimension of the relevant market for this operation, the SDE
chose to use di￿erent criteria, taking into account the fact the supermarkets were located on cities
of di￿ering sizes, from Sao Paulo ￿ one of the largest cities in the world ￿ to cities with less
than one hundred thousand inhabitants. For cities with more than one million inhabitants, the
Antitrust Authority relied on a study commissioned by the Brazilian Supermarkets’ Association,
which purported to describe the area capable of attracting about 70% of the customers of a given
store. For supermarkets with more than 20 check-outs, the study indicated this area is of about 2,5
kilometers, and for supermarkets with more than 40 check-outs, this area was set at 5 kilometers.
These values were used to establish the relevant geographic markets. For cities with less than one
million inhabitants, the Authority de￿ned the relevant geographic market as the boundaries of the
municipality.
Based on these concepts, SDE issued an opinion the entity resulting from the merger has market
power on ￿ve cities located on the southern shore of the State of Sao Paulo: Cubatao, Sao Vicente,
Guaruja, Itanhaem and Praia Grande. These cities are shown on the map below:
Figure 1: Map of the Cities
Source: Brazilian Geographic and Statistics Institute (IBGE).
Considering these markets, the SDE issued an opinion to the deciding body requiring CBD to
divest one of its supermarkets on the city of Cubatao, disregarding the fact that the consumer who
de￿nes the geographic relevant market is not the average, but the marginal one, who is indi￿erent
between consuming on one store or another. That consumer is the one relevant for the pricing
decision of the ￿hypothetical monopolist￿ used on the Merger Guidelines applied by almost every
8one of the Antitrust Authorities in the world. Even if 70% of the consumers of a given supermarket
are located in a perimeter of 5 kilometers around a given supermarket, one can easily deduce that,
for given demand con￿guration, a hypothetical monopolist refrains from increasing its prices even if
the the same share of customers keep going to the same supermarket. Considering the inadequacies
of the geographic market de￿nition espoused by the Authority, the next step is to determine it
empirically. This will be the subject of the following sections.
3.1 Data Analysis
In order to investigate the hypothesis put above, we had data on 44 supermarkets, whose geograph-
ical locations and ownership are presented on the Appendix 1 and are depicted on the following
picture:
Figure 2: Geographic Locations of the Supermarkets
This spatial con￿guration was used to compute the distances ￿ in kilometers ￿ between super-
markets, which are depicted on the picture on the Appendix 2. This is such that the minimum
distance between two supermarkets is about 200 meters and the longest distance is just over 93 kilo-
9meters. For each supermarket, we had data on the 500 products with most sales in BRL (Brazilian
Reais), for a period of fourteen months between January, 2003 and February 2004. However, these
500 products were not the same in each location; thus, we had to select some of them to carry
out our analysis. The selected products, chosen because they appeared on the greatest number of
months on the greatest number of supermarkets, are as follows10:
Table 2: Selected Products
Product Brand Package Size
Hot Chocolate Mix Toddy 400g
Re￿ned Sugar Uniao 1Kg
Rice Tio Joao 5Kg










Condensed Milk Moca 395g
Mayonnaise Hellman’s 500g
Margarine Qualy Crem 500g
Watermelon Kg
Tomato Sauce Pomarola 340g
Mozzarela Kg
Cheese Kg
Soft Drink Guarana 2L
Soft Drink Coca-Cola 350ML
For each of the products, the spatial covariance was calculated as a function of distance. The
covariances obtained were normalized by dividing it by the global variance11. A graphical example
of the estimates ￿ for product 2, Uniao Re￿ned Sugar ￿ is presented on the Appendix 3, and values
for some distances are presented on the table below:
10Their descriptive statistics are presented on Appendix 4.
11 That means, the variance of all observations on the selected product for all supermarkets and months. The
rationale for this normalization is as such. Under the current model, the deviations from the means, denoted u,
could be decomposed into two components, one collecting the spatially determined aspects of the variable (denoted
µ), and another one the random components (denoted ²). Thus, we can write this relation as:
u = µ + ²
The normalization described on the text means the spatial covariance converges to the spatial correlation coe￿-
cient if µ corresponds to a larger fraction of the total variance of u then ². All estimates were carried out using the
MATLAB software, version 7.0.1. The code used on all estimates is available upon request
10Table 3: Spatial Covariance Estimates
Products Distance - in Km
0.22 10.0 20.1 30.2 50.1 92.0
1 0.59947 0.60742 0.74686 0.85524 0.5822 0.80014
2 0.94081 0.93437 0.93543 0.96521 1.0028 0.9571
3 0.88844 0.91314 0.92393 0.90762 0.92458 0.88782
4 0.57532 0.5852 0.66484 0.64201 0.28372 0.57744
5 0.42362 0.5572 0.45214 0.23734 0.4155 0.39352
6 0.53426 0.57355 0.61191 0.63996 0.4736 0.57643
7 0.45879 0.45955 0.41168 0.4696 0.47414 0.43027
8 0.44943 0.49344 0.45199 0.48934 0.37327 0.36969
9 0.68389 0.71559 0.66271 0.71299 0.56572 0.51792
10 0.72434 0.71683 0.69866 0.62802 0.56077 0.70425
11 0.51007 0.48723 0.47272 0.58807 0.54808 0.54028
12 0.76443 0.7742 0.79727 0.79434 0.71347 0.7695
13 0.76177 0.78738 0.78833 0.86001 0.92414 0.80056
14 0.53998 0.49633 0.49878 0.5628 0.51204 0.5267
15 0.38283 0.41068 0.47144 0.44311 0.41565 0.39502
16 0.60658 0.5802 0.61612 0.63633 0.53561 0.73912
17 0.77716 0.77615 0.72515 0.7447 0.85412 0.78834
18 0.49783 0.5991 0.65854 0.82389 0.60629 0.49433
19 0.44718 0.4698 0.50278 0.56978 0.41909 0.41138
20 0.56647 0.50989 0.55559 0.59291 0.47336 0.57242
21 0.62413 0.64224 0.56374 0.54167 0.65542 0.59559
22 0.47898 0.51001 0.5685 0.59343 0.48683 0.48299
Every one of the estimates above are outside of the bootstrapped 95% con￿dence region, in-
dicating we can reject the hypothesis of non-correlation between prices at locations separated by
these distances. Considering what we have posed before, this indicates the decision the SDE made
regarding the geographic market de￿nition is incorrect.
However, some other points must be addressed before a ￿nal conclusion can be presented. Some
extensions of this result are presented on the following section.
3.2 Extensions
Despite indicating the relevant market is composed of all the cities mentioned above, these results
must be further re￿ned, for they could be subject of criticism from di￿erent points of view. The
￿rst one pertains to the fact the products in the sample ￿ being one of the 500 products with the
most sales for each product ￿ are the result of a distribution process and marketing campaigns
de￿ned at the level of supermarket chain. Even the Brazilian Antitrust Authority, on its ￿nal
report for the decision body, mentioned a study in Kwoka and White (2003), mentioning that only
1,5% of the products sold by the Toys ’R’ Us retailer were priced according to the local conditions.
Another important criticism, coming from a point of view, pertains to the fact local stores
could select its protfolio of goods sold, and this portfolio could be a strategic variable for the
competition between supermarkets; thus, the covariance could be biased due to the omission of
11relevant variables. And ￿nally, the pricing decisions of the companies might be a￿ected by the
socio-economic characteristics of the cities ￿ or neighborhoods ￿ in which the supermarkets are
located.
In order to address these criticisms, we extended our analysis, in which we were forced to
adopt some simplifying assumptions. The ￿rst one is that the geographic location decisions are
exogenous to the pricing decisions12. The second one is that the marketing and distribution policies
are decided on the level of the chain, and these decisions are constant throghout the period of
analysis. Finally, we assume the socio-demographic characteristics of the cities to be constant
during this period, also.
These assumptions allow us to model this characteristics as ￿xed e￿ects for each supermarket
chain and city, leading to the following model for each of the prices:




On which Pit refers to the price of any of the products selected on the supermarket i at time
period t, CHAINit is a dummy with the value of one for the supermarkets belonging to the CBD
chain and zero otherwise. The Dkit denotes a set of six dummies for the cities of Sao Vicente,
Guaruja, Santos, Praia Grande, Cubatao and Peruibe. The V ACATIONit variable is another
dummy variable, intended to capture the e￿ects on the prices due to the holiday season (from
December to February). The cities involved on this case are beach cities not far from the largest
city in Brazil, Sao Paulo, and important tourist destinations. The regression results13 for each of
the products are on the table below:
Table 4: Regression Results
Product Constant CHAIN Guaruja Praia Grande Peruibe Sao Vicente Santos VACATION R2
1 3.222 ** 0.003 0.160 ** 0.202 ** 0.216 * 0.101 0.041 -0.352 ** 0.180
2 1.165 ** 0.012 0.028 0.051 * 0.033 0.028 0.022 -0.137 ** 0.158
3 9.776 ** 0.041 0.190 0.202 0.149 0.219 0.205 0.205 ** 0.013
4 2.085 ** 0.012 0.122 ** 0.192 ** 0.140 ** 0.172 ** 0.133 ** -0.183 ** 0.205
5 3.551 ** 0.037 0.129 ** 0.174 ** 0.185 ** 0.148 ** 0.070 ** 0.071 ** 0.110
6 0.724 ** 0.017 ** 0.035 ** 0.060 ** 0.031 ** 0.042 ** 0.030 ** -0.019 ** 0.111
7 0.905 ** 0.010 * 0.031 ** 0.044 ** 0.029 ** 0.034 ** 0.026 ** 0.010 ** 0.064
8 0.760 ** 0.009 ** 0.028 ** 0.038 ** 0.026 ** 0.025 ** 0.025 ** -0.031 ** 0.163
9 2.439 ** 0.042 * 0.084 ** 0.152 ** 0.243 ** 0.114 ** 0.047 -0.224 ** 0.269
10 9.212 ** -0.464 ** -0.630 ** -0.681 ** -0.610 ** -0.858 ** -0.553 ** 0.920 ** 0.236
11 5.385 ** 0.107 ** 0.245 ** 0.374 ** 0.048 0.266 ** 0.193 ** -0.177 ** 0.115
12 2.242 ** 0.018 0.088 ** 0.097 ** 0.030 0.063 0.045 0.048 ** 0.035
13 1.472 ** 0.022 * 0.044 ** 0.057 ** 0.033 0.041 ** 0.027 -0.060 ** 0.110
14 1.697 ** 0.032 ** 0.095 ** 0.126 ** 0.107 ** 0.111 ** 0.069 ** -0.115 ** 0.271
15 3.475 ** 0.020 0.154 ** 0.189 ** 0.125 ** 0.160 ** 0.117 ** 0.047 ** 0.105
16 2.834 ** -0.024 0.002 0.016 -0.038 -0.055 -0.040 -0.002 0.022
17 0.567 ** 0.000 0.002 0.031 0.027 0.011 0.014 0.003 0.010
18 1.342 ** -0.011 -0.003 -0.015 0.053 0.012 0.006 0.092 ** 0.098
19 10.552 ** 0.043 0.123 0.336 * -0.478 * -0.382 * -0.142 -0.215 * 0.048
20 11.224 ** -0.089 0.114 0.384 ** 0.020 -0.445 * 0.012 -0.468 ** 0.071
21 1.734 ** 0.028 ** 0.064 ** 0.119 ** 0.063 ** 0.077 ** 0.059 ** -0.052 ** 0.162
22 0.862 ** 0.015 ** 0.032 ** 0.058 ** 0.024 0.036 ** 0.027 ** -0.039 ** 0.235
OBS: ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
12 This assumption is not unduly restrictive, since we did not observe any location changes during the period of
analysis.
13With con￿dence levels indicated by stars calculated from Newey-West standard errors with one lag on the
autoregression part of the estimates.
12The Spatial Covariance of the residuals, also scaled by the global variance is also presented on
the following table:
Table 5: Spatial Covariance Estimates
Product Distance in Km
0.22 10.01 20.11 30.20 50.09 92.00
1 0.518 0.540 0.651 0.782 0.491 0.705
2 0.936 0.924 0.920 0.956 0.994 0.958
3 0.889 0.912 0.922 0.908 0.923 0.889
4 0.470 0.489 0.563 0.537 0.205 0.470
5 0.380 0.534 0.452 0.266 0.399 0.365
6 0.533 0.554 0.577 0.617 0.482 0.577
7 0.448 0.456 0.411 0.464 0.464 0.414
8 0.375 0.400 0.359 0.401 0.305 0.347
9 0.557 0.579 0.561 0.597 0.437 0.538
10 0.645 0.633 0.592 0.525 0.531 0.612
11 0.469 0.463 0.451 0.554 0.537 0.470
12 0.757 0.773 0.786 0.777 0.719 0.761
13 0.761 0.765 0.752 0.826 0.900 0.821
14 0.354 0.350 0.352 0.366 0.311 0.338
15 0.385 0.395 0.443 0.435 0.407 0.398
16 0.606 0.580 0.617 0.638 0.535 0.738
17 0.777 0.776 0.725 0.744 0.854 0.789
18 0.473 0.544 0.609 0.769 0.548 0.510
19 0.452 0.461 0.489 0.553 0.401 0.433
20 0.536 0.475 0.519 0.545 0.419 0.597
21 0.583 0.586 0.493 0.495 0.630 0.562
22 0.359 0.352 0.347 0.262 0.336 0.359
Just as in the case presented above, every one of the covariances is outside of the con￿dence
interval for the null hypothesis of zero spatial covariance at that distance14. Thus, one can conclude
that the relevant market for the considered merger is composed of all the cities envolved.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we aim to identify the relevant geographic market for a proposed merger between
two competing supermarket chains, CBD and PERALTA. In order to do so, we ￿rst reviewed
the legal and theoretical aspects behind the determination of the relevant market, indicating the
shortcomings of the analysis carried out by the Brazilian Antitrust Authority on its evaluation of
the merger. This analysis decreed the geographic dimension of the relevant market to be separated
on each of the municipalities on the shore of the Sao Paulo state.
After that, we proposed a methodology for determining the geographic dimension of the market
by the estimation of a Spatial Covariance function. The estimation was carried out on a data sample
14 We also carried out estimates with the ￿rst di￿erences of the prices, and with a ￿rst di￿erence version of the
equation above. However, the results did not change and, for that reason, were not reported.
13constructed by collected data on 22 products for 43 supermarkets, for the period from January
2003 to February 2004.
Initially, we calculated spatial covariances for di￿erent distances, which indicated signi￿cant
covariances at all distances, which indicated a single geographic market embracing the eight cities
(Sao Vicente, Santos, Guaruja, Praia Grande, Cubatao, Mongagua, Itanhaem, Peruibe) which
were held as separate markets.
Conscious of the shortcomings of the analysis, we extended the analysis trying to control for
di￿erences on the socio-economic variables of the cities, as well as di￿erences on policies chosen
by each supermarket chain, and seasonal patterns of consumption. The results con￿rmed the ones
found on the previous section, indicating a single geographic relevant market for this merger.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 - Stores Used
Code City Longitude Latitude
18 Santos -46.3231 -23.959
44 Santos -46.3091 -23.9713
52 Guaruja -46.2586 -23.9919
66 Santos -46.3083 -23.9843
69 Praia Grande -46.4125 -24.0079
102 Guaruja -46.2894 -23.9566
205 Sao Vicente -46.3702 -23.9714
692 Santos -46.3357 -23.947
694 Sao Vicente -46.3054 -23.9407
697 Praia Grande -46.4608 -24.0188
752 Itanhaem -46.7877 24.18392
Continues on Next Page
15Code City Longitude Latitude
1008 Guaruja -46.2573 -23.9966
1217 Peruibe -46.9988 -24.3206
1740 Cubatao -46.4287 -23.8729
1741 Cubatao -46.4084 -23.9271
1742 Santos -46.3377 -23.9583
1743 Santos -46.3083 -23.9814
1744 Cubatao -46.4207 -23.8825
1745 Santos -46.3616 -23.9349
1746 Sao Vicente -46.4072 -23.9549
1747 Santos -46.3005 -23.9769
1748 Mongagua -46.6188 -24.0927
1749 Guaruja -46.2635 -23.9883
1750 Santos -46.3129 -23.964
1751 Peruibe -46.9936 -24.3152
1752 Itanhaem -46.7829 -24.1805
1753 Praia Grande -46.4205 -24.0121
1754 Sao Vicente -46.4925 -23.9855
1755 Guaruja -46.2779 -23.9913
1756 Guaruja -46.2715 -23.9787
1757 Sao Vicente -46.3767 -23.9682
1758 Santos -46.3187 -23.9755
1772 Santos -46.3216 -23.9431
1773 Praia Grande -46.4798 -24.027
1776 Praia Grande -46.4181 -24.0033
1777 Sao Vicente -46.3753 -23.9554
1813 Guaruja -46.2034 -23.9857
1821 Guaruja -46.2827 -23.9396
1853 Guaruja -46.237 -23.9834
2332 Santos -46.3442 -23.9678
2354 Guaruja -46.2468 -23.988
1348 Santos -46.3319 -23.9577
1327 Praia Grande -46.3986 -23.9878
16Appendix 2 - Histogram of Distances
Figure 3: Histogram of Distances










Appendix 3 - Spatial Covariance Function
Figure 4: Spatial Covariance Function









spatial cov. esti. (B−spline) with b.s. acceptance region of indep.
distance
17Appendix 4 - Products ￿ Descriptive Statistics
Product Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Number of Obs.
1 3.195 0.434 2.040 4.880 560
2 1.147 0.170 0.660 1.480 602
3 10.037 1.050 7.460 11.886 602
4 2.153 0.227 1.760 2.950 588
5 3.687 0.214 2.409 4.226 462
6 0.757 0.060 0.618 0.910 602
7 0.940 0.055 0.780 1.076 602
8 0.776 0.046 0.660 0.884 602
9 2.451 0.236 1.880 2.971 490
10 8.800 1.110 6.488 12.050 602
11 5.566 0.413 4.700 6.892 546
12 2.324 0.210 1.801 2.906 602
13 1.493 0.104 1.170 1.715 602
14 1.749 0.131 1.331 2.118 602
15 3.624 0.188 2.800 4.131 574
16 2.806 0.188 2.205 3.640 574
17 0.580 0.107 0.343 0.968 476
18 1.375 0.150 0.967 1.808 420
19 10.452 1.161 7.514 13.430 532
20 11.050 1.178 8.451 14.040 532
21 1.790 0.106 1.530 1.995 588
22 0.884 0.052 0.690 0.990 574
18